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LmIALTY OF ACCOUNTANTS FOR PROXY VIOLATIONs-THE APPRO-
PRIATE STANDARD OF CULPABILITY-Adams v. Standard Knitting
Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067
(1980).
In Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc.,I the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit found an accounting firm not liable to shareholders for
an error made in the preparation of financial reports accompanying a
proxy statement. The court held that scienter2 was necessary to find liabil-
ity for an accounting firm's error; a mere showing of negligence was in-
sufficient. Because the court based its finding on the grounds that the
proper degree of culpability had not been proven, it must have assumed
that, under some circumstances, accountants can be held liable for proxy
violations.
This note will first examine whether in fact accountants can be held
primarily liable for proxy violations. Concluding that they can, the note
will scrutinize the court's opinion to determine whether it requires scien-
ter for all primary violators or only for accountants. The court's rationale
suggests that the court intended to apply a uniform standard of culpabil-
ity. This note will then compare the court's reasoning with the reasoning
that led courts in two other circuits to choose, at least in some cases,
negligence as the standard for primary violators. The comparison will
show negligence to be the more appropriate minimum standard under the
policies of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 and SEC
rule 14a-9.4
Finally, this note concludes that a uniform standard of culpability can-
not equitably be applied to the wide range of potential defendants and that
perhaps the Adams court reached its holding by implicitly applying a flex-
ible-duty standard. This would justify requiring scienter for accountants,
but negligence for other, more central participants in proxy violations.
Alternatively, the court's result could be justified on an aiding and abet-
ting theory without finding an accountant primarily liable under the stat-
ute.
I. BACKGROUND OF PROXY REGULATION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates the solicita-
tion of proxies under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1. 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
2. The court in Adams defined scienter as "a desire to deceive, defraud or manipulate." Id. at
427. This follows the Supreme Court's definition in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193
n.12 (1976).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). For the text of this section, see note 5 infra.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981). For the pertinent text of this section, see note 6 infra.
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1934. 5 This section forbids any person to solicit, or permit the use of his
or her name to solicit, a proxy in violation of the rules and regulations
promulgated by the SEC for the protection of investors. Rule 14a-9, 6
adopted by the SEC under section 14(a), prohibits making false or mis-
leading statements with respect to a material fact in any proxy solicita-
tion. It also prohibits the omission of a material fact necessary to make a
statement true or not misleading.
Although section 14(a) does not expressly provide civil or criminal
penalties, in 1964 the United States Supreme Court found in section 14(a)
an implied private cause of action. 7 The Court stated that although the
language of the statute "makes no specific reference to a private right of
action, among its chief purposes is 'the protection of investors,' which
certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to
achieve that result." 8
In the 1970 case of Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 9 the Court held that
to state a cause of action a shareholder need only show that the defect in
the proxy statement was material. 10 The Court rejected the common law
fraud test, which requires that the injured party rely on the misrepresenta-
tion, because of the impracticality of testing reliance by thousands of
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). This section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his
name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an
exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981). This rule, entitled "False or misleading statements," pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy statement,
form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral, containing any state-
ment which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or
misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary
in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any state-
ment in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meet-
ing or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
7. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
8. Id. at 432. The Court stated that the remedy could be money damages, because "the possibil-
ity of civil damages . . . serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy require-
ments. " Id.
9. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
10. TheCourt stated:
Where there has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient showing of
causal relationship between the violation and the injury for which he seeks redress if, as here, he
proves that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation materi-
als, was an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction.
Id. at 385.
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stockholders.'1 "Materiality" was defined generally as a requirement
that the defect have a significant propensity to affect the share voting pro-
cess. 12 The 1976 case of TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 13 pro-
vided the Court with the opportunity to further define materiality: "An
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." 14
In TSC Industries, the Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment on
the issue of the proper standard of culpability under section 14(a).15 The
Court has not addressed this issue since. 16 Although the language of nei-
ther the statute nor of rule 14a-9 sets forth a standard, all courts that have
considered the question have required some showing of culpability. 17 In
11. Id. at 382 n.5. The Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's reliance test, which proposed exam-
ining the underlying fairness of the transaction approved by the shareholders because "[u]se of a
solicitation that is materially misleading is itself a violation of law. ... Id. at 383. The Court
claimed that the objective materiality test "will avoid the impracticalities of determining how many
votes were affected, and, by resolving doubts in favor of those the statute is designed to protect, will
effectuate the congressional policy of ensuring that the shareholders are able to make an informed
choice when they are consulted on corporate transactions." Id. at 385.
12. Id. at 384.
13. 426U.S. 438(1976).
14. Id. at449.
15. The Court stated:
Our cases have not considered, and we have no occasion in this case to consider, what show-
ing of culpability is required to establish the liability under § 14(a) of a corporation issuing a
materially misleading proxy statement, or of a person involved in the preparation of a materially
misleading proxy statement.
Id. at 444 n.7.
16. The Court did mention the use by courts of a negligence standard under § 14(a) in a footnote
when it decided to impose a scienter requirement under § 10(b) in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 209 n.28 (1976), stating:
Emphasizing the important difference between the operative language and purpose of § 14(a) of
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), as contrasted with § 10(b), however, some courts have con-
cluded that proof of scienter is unnecessary in an action for damages by the shareholder recipi-
ents of a materially misleading proxy statement against the issuer corporation. Gerstle v. Gam-
ble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 (CA2 1973).
One commentator suggested that Hochfelder makes the use of a negligence standard of culpability
questionable. Calhoun, Divining the Implications of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 1 CoRP. L. REv.
99, 115-17 (1978). But see Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 778 (3d Cir.
1976), where the court cited Hochfelder as support for their use of a negligence standard stating:
We are confirmed in this view by the very recent case of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, in which
the Supreme Court pointed out that the "operative language and purpose" of each particular
section of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 are important considerations in determining the standard of
liability for violations of the section in question.
(citation omitted).
17. Most courts have accepted negligence as the proper standard of culpability. See Gould v.
American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478
F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Del Noce v. Delyar Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
RaP. (CCH) 95,670 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Berman v. Thomson, 403 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1975);
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354 F. Supp. 895 (D. Del. 1973);
Norte & Co. v. R.L. Huffines, 304 F. Supp. 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in pertinent part, 416 F.2d
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Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,18 the Second Circuit held that, for the
corporation soliciting the proxies, negligence was the appropriate stan-
dard of culpability. 19 In Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 20
the Third Circuit extended the negligence standard beyond the soliciting
corporation to an outside, non-management director. Then, in Adams v.
Standard Knitting Mills, Inc.,21 the Sixth Circuit held that scienter was
the appropriate standard for an accountant.
The results reached in these cases are not necessarily inconsistent since
each may be limited to its facts. A comparison of the reasoning used by
the respective circuits, however, indicates a conflict between the Sixth
Circuit and the Second and Third Circuits on the minimum standard of
culpability applicable to proxy violators.
II. THE COURT'S REASONING IN ADAMS v. STANDARD
KNITTING MILLS, INC.
In Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc.,22 the defendant accounting
firm prepared financial statements on Chadbourn, Inc. These financial
statements accompanied a solicitation of proxies by Standard Knitting
Mills, Inc.'s management from its shareholders, in which it favored a
merger with Chadbourn. Under the terms of the proposed merger, Stan-
dard Knitting Mills' shareholders would exchange their common stock
for Chadbourn preferred stock. 23 A footnote in the financial statement
claimed that Chadbourn's debt agreement restricted the payment of com-
mon stock dividends, but would not restrict dividends on the preferred
1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (dicta): Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp.
538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (dicta). But see Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills Inc., 623 F.2d 422 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
For a discussion of why strict liability is not applied under § 14(a), see Gould v. American-Hawai-
ian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 859 (D. Del. 1972), aff'd, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976). See also
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300 (2d Cir. 1973).
18. 478 F.2d 1281, 1298-99 (2d Cir. 1973).
19. The court stated, however, that scienter may be an appropriate standard of culpability on
different facts. Id. at 1300.
20. 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976).
21. 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
22. Id.
23. The merger offer proposed that:
In return for their common, plaintiffs were to receive cumulative preferred dividends larger than
dividends declared historically on Standard common, each share of preferred was convertible
into Chadboum common, the preferred was readily marketable on the New York Stock Ex-
change for cash, a small amount of Chadboum common would be distributed pro rata among
holders of the preferred if Standard achieved certain earnings goals, and Chadbourn promised to
redeem the preferred at $11 per share in installments from 1975 to 1979 to shareholders desiring
redemption.
Id. at 438-39 (Weick, J., dissenting).
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stock the Standard Knitting Mills' shareholders were to receive. 24 One
year after the merger, Chadbourn suffered financial setbacks. Contrary to
the footnote in the financial statement, the debt agreement in fact kept it
from paying the preferred stock dividends. The plaintiff shareholders
brought suit against Standard Knitting Mills, Chadbourn, their respective
lawyers, and their accountants for violation of sections 10(b)25 and 14(a)
of the 1934 Act and SEC rules lOb-5 26 and 14a-9. 27
Both the district court and the court of appeals agreed that the footnote
was false and misleading as to a material fact; they disagreed on the ac-
countants' culpability. The district court found that the defendant ac-
counting firm, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (Peat), had acted with sci-
enter with respect to the erroneous footnote and therefore was liable under
both rule lOb-5 and rule 14a-9. 28 The district court's finding of scienter
was based on the fact that Peat had been informed of its error in the foot-
24. The footnote read in pertinent part:
(c) As to the note payable to three banks, the Company has agreed to various restrictive provi-
sions including those relating to maintenance of minimum stockholders' equity and working
capital, the purchase, sale or encumbering of fixed assets, incurrance [sic] of indebtedness, the
leasing of additional assets and the payment of dividends on common stock in excess of $2,000,-
000 plus earnings subsequent to August 2, 1969.
Id. at 426.
25. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976), provides in pertinent
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
(emphasis added).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1981), entitled "Employment of manipulative and deceptive de-
vices," provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
27. The plaintiff shareholders settled out of court with the defendants other than Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. (Peat), the accountant for Chadbourn, Inc. The former Standard Knitting Mills share-
holders were given control of Chadboum under the settlement agreement. 623 F.2d at 425.
28. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FaD. SEC. L. RP. (CCH) 95,683 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
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note by Chadbourn's outside counsel, but did not amend the footnote or
attempt to alert the stockholders to the error. 29
The court of appeals.overturned the district court's finding of scienter,
stating that Peat's failure to foresee "that the bottom would drop out of
Chadbourn's earnings and that what appeared to be a minor error at the
time would become a major bone of contention" 30 was mere negligence,
not a "desire to deceive, defraud or manipulate." 31 The court thus re-
versed the portion of Peat's liability based on rule lOb-5, since liability
under rule 1Ob-5 requires a finding of scienter. 32
The appellate court then considered whether scienter should also be
required to hold Peat liable under rule 14a-9. The answer, the court
stated, depended not only on the language of the statute but also on legis-
lative history and public policy. 33 The court concluded from committee
reports and congressional debates that section 14(a) was intended to pre-
vent only knowing or reckless wrongdoing of outsiders. 34 It found no in-
dication that Congress intended investors to be protected against the neg-
ligence of accountants in preparing proxy materials. The court also
compared provisions of the tender offer statute35 to the proxy provisions
because congressional statements indicated that tender offers would be
treated similarly to proxy solicitations. Because the tender offer statute
29. Id. at 90,355. Peat was informed of the footnote error between March 23, 1970 and April 1,
1970. It did not contact the shareholders even though the proxy material was mailed to the sharehold-
ers on March 27, 1970.
The district court judge also found fault with Peat's valuation of the closing inventory (which
would falsely increase the retained earnings), its valuation of Chadbourn's accounts receivable, and
its failure to disclose defects in Chadbourn's computerized accounting system. The appeals court held
these alleged defects to be at most negligent and therefore unimportant in light of its holding on the
appropriate culpability standard. 623 F.2d at 431-36.
30. Id. at428.
31. Id. at 427.
32. The Supreme Court held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), that there
must be a showing of scienter before an accountant can be held liable under § 10(b).
33. 623 F.2d at 428. See notes 65-80 and accompanying text infra for more discussion of the
courts of appeals' views on the appropriate standard of liability.
34. Id. at 430.
35. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for
tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer,
request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and
regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices
as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
(emphasis added). This section was added in 1968 as part of the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439,
§ 3, 82 Stat. 457 (1968).
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required scienter, the court held that section 14(a) implicitly required sci-
enter as well. 36
Furthermore, because the private right of action under section 14(a)
was judicially created, the court claimed it had a "special responsibility
to consider the consequences of [its ruling] and to mold liability fairly to
reflect the circumstances of the parties. ",37 The circumstances of the par-
ties in Adams influenced the court against using a negligence standard.
Peat was not in privity with the plaintiff shareholders and did not directly
benefit from the proxy vote. The court claimed that a negligence standard
would expose accounting firms to potentially enormous liability for minor
mistakes in their daily work of preparing financial statements. 38 This po-
tential liability would not be limited by procedural safeguards, such as
privity or reliance, present in other securities provisions where negligence
is the standard of culpability. 39 The court therefore concluded that a
higher standard, scienter, was necessary to establish liability.
Judge Weick, dissenting, disagreed with the majority's reversal of the
finding of scienter. He argued that the majority had engaged in a de novo
review of the trial court's finding rather than applying the proper "clearly
erroneous" standard under which the district court's finding of scienter
would have been upheld. 40 Judge Weick noted that the accountant
charged "a fee that was 125% of its usual fee because 'SEC work does
36. 623 F.2d at 430-31.
37. Id. at 428.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 428-29. The court cites as examples of procedural safeguards § I 1 of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976), which imposes liability for negligent misrepresentation in
registration statements only if there is proof of investor reliance, and § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 771(1976), which imposes liability for negligent misrepresentation in a prospectus provided
there is privity. In fact, the court overstates its case here, as § 11 only requires reliance after an
earning statement has been issued for a 12-month period following the effective date of the registra-
tion statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
The majority noted that no shareholders had testified that they were deceived. The dissent pointed
out that requiring a showing of reliance under either rule lob-5 or rule 14a-9 violates Supreme
Court holdings on this point. 623 F.2d at 443-44 (Weick, J., dissenting). See also note 11 and
accompanying text supra.
40. Id. at 436-37 (Weick, J., dissenting). The dissent cited both Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395
U.S. 100 (1969), and FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) as support for its claim that the majority had not properly
applied the clearly erroneous standard. In Zenith, the Supreme Court said that "[i]n applying the
clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts
must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo." 623 F.2d at
436 (Weick, J., dissenting) (quoting Zenith, 395 U.S. at 123). FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides in
pertinent part: "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979) (recklessness a
factual determination). But see Edward & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478,
485 (2d Cir. 1979) ("negligence is a mixed question of fact and law, and we are not necessarily
bound by the limitation of Rule 52(a)").
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require a higher degree of risk.' "41 The judge argued further that even if
the original error was a mere "slip of the pen," the failure to correct it
after it was called to the firm's attention was deliberate. 42 Thus, Judge
Weick concluded that there was substantial evidence supporting the dis-
trict court's finding that Peat had "intent to 'deceive' and 'manipulate'
and [acted] in 'reckless disregard of the truth.' "43
Judge Weick also claimed that even if the accounting firm did not have
an intent to deceive, its conduct was at least reckless. He claimed that the
majority, by failing to find recklessness, had implicitly overruled Mans-
bach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben,44 in which the Sixth Circuit found reck-
lessness sufficient to satisfy a scienter requirement.
45
Finally, Judge Weick argued that considerable weight should be given
to the views of the SEC as the agency charged with administering the
statute. 46 As amicus curiae on a rehearing petition, the SEC asserted that
scienter should not be required to impose liability under rule 14a-9.
47
The SEC further argued that, if scienter was required, recklessness should
satisfy the requirement. In addition, the SEC claimed that although the
majority had in effect treated the accounting firm as a secondary partici-
pant it had failed to apply traditional concepts of secondary liability.
48
III. ANALYSIS
In Adams, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit assumed that ac-
countants can be liable under the proxy provisions when it based its rever-
sal on the need to find scienter before imposing liability. It did not, how-
ever, discuss the issue. To date, no other court has held an accountant
liable under the proxy provisions, while one court has suggested that ac-
41. 623 F.2d at 439 (Weick, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 442 (Weick, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 443 (Weick, J., dissenting).
44. 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979). The court held that recklessness satisfied the scienter require-
ment of § 10(b). The court defined recklessness as "highly unreasonable conduct which is an extreme
departure from the standards of ordinary care. While the danger need not be known, it must at least be
so obvious that any reasonable man would have known of it." Id. at 1025 (citing Sunstrand Corp. v.
Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977)).
45. 623 F.2d at 443 n. I (Weick, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 447 (Weick, J., dissenting). The dissent's view accords with Supreme Court comments
on the subject. In Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965), the Court, when construing the weight to
give a proclamation of the Secretary of the Interior, stated: "When faced with a problem of statutory
construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or
agency charged with its administration. . . . When the construction of an administrative regulation
rather than a statute is in issue, deference is even more clearly in order."
47. 623 F.2d at 446-47 (Weick, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
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countants could not be held liable under section 14(a) for preparing the
proxies. 49
A. Can Accountants Be Held Liablefor Proxy Violations?
Section 14(a) states: "It shall be unlawful for any person ... to solicit
or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy" in contravention of
the SEC rules and regulations. 50 Given this language, it can be argued
that liability is limited to those who solicit or allow the use of their names
for solicitation.
A number of SEC interpretations suggest that the preparation of proxy
statements by accountants is not within the definition of "solicit." For
example, rule 14a-1 defines the terms "solicit" and "solicitation" to
include any request for a proxy, any request to execute a proxy, and fur-
nishing a proxy form under circumstances implying a request for a
proxy.51 Thus, to "solicit," a person must take affirmative action to pro-
cure a proxy; it is questionable whether merely preparing the proxy state-
ment accompanying the procuring is sufficient.
49. In Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 865 (D. Del. 1972), aff'd, 535
F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976), the district court stated:
Section 14(a) imposes liability on individuals soliciting proxies, and not on the attorneys or
accountants preparing them. Thus, unless the responsibility for examining proxy statements is
borne by the directors and others who are potentially liable for misstatements, § 14(a) will be
rendered largely ineffectual whenever proxy materials are prepared by experts or others not in-
volved in the solicitation.
50. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (1981), entitled "Definitions," provides in pertinent part:
Unless the context otherwise requires, all terms used in §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14a-10 and in
Schedule 14A have the same meanings as in the act or elsewhere in the general rules and regula-
tions thereunder. In addition, the following definitions apply unless the context otherwise re-
quires:
(d) Proxy. The term "proxy" includes every proxy, consent or authorization within the
meaning of section 14(a) of the act. The consent or authorization may take the form of failure to
object or to dissent.
(f) Solicitation. (1) The terms "solicit" and "solicitation" include:
(i) Any request for a proxy whether or not accompanied by or included in a form of proxy;
(ii) Any request to execute or not to execute, or to revoke, a proxy; or
(iii) The furnishing of a form of proxy or other communication to security holders under cir-
cumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a
proxy.
(2) The terms do not apply, however, to the furnishing of a form of proxy to a security holder
upon the unsolicited request of such security holder, the performance by the issuer of acts re-
quired by § 240.14a-7, or the performance by any person of ministerial acts on behalf of a
person soliciting a proxy.
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Rule 14a- 11,52 which applies when dissident shareholders challenge
present management in a proxy contest, provides further support for the
exclusion of accountants from the class of solicitors. The rule requires
both sides to completely disclose all "participants" in the contest. 53 In
defining "participants," however, the rule explicitly excludes "any per-
son employed by a participant in the capacity of . . .accountant . . .
whose activities are limited to the performance of his duties in the course
of such employment. -4 These rules suggest that when accountants are
engaged only to prepare financial reports for proxy statements, the SEC
does not consider them to be persons who "solicit" under the statute.
The proxy statute also applies to those who permit the use of their
names for solicitation of proxies; 55 rule 14a- 10156 requires that the ac-
countant's name be listed in any proxy solicitation by management in-
volving a merger proposal. Therefore, an accountant could conceivably
be liable under the second phase of the statute. The Ninth Circuit, inter-
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1981), entitled "Special provisions applicable to election con-
tests," provides in pertinent part:
(a) Solicitations to which this section applies. This section applies to any solicitation . . . by
any person or group of persons for the purpose of opposing a solicitation ... by any other person
or group of persons with respect to the election or removal of directors at any annual or special
meeting of security holders.
(b) Participant or participant in a solicitation. For purposes of this rule the terms "partici-
pant" and 4'participant in a solicitation" include the following:
(6) Any other person who solicits proxies. The foregoing terms do not, however, include...
(iii) any person employed by a participant in the capacity of attorney, accountant, or advertising.
public relations or financial adviser, and whose activities are limited to the performance of his
duties in the course of such employment ....
53. Id. at § 240.14a- 1 (c) & (d).
54. Id. at§240.14a-1l(b)(6).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). The pertinent part of this section states: "It shall be unlawful for
any person . . . in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe...
to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy .... "See generally note 5 supra (complete text of
section).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1981), entitled "'Schedule 14A. Information required in proxy
statement," states in pertinent part:
Item 8. Relationship with independent public accountants. If the solicitation is made on behalf
of the issuer and relates to an annual meeting of security holders at which directors are to be
elected, or financial statements are included pursuant to Item 15, furnish the following informa-
tion describing the issuer's relationship with its independent public accountants:
(a) The name of the principal accountant selected or being recommended to shareholders for
election, approval or ratification for the current year. If no accountant has been selected or rec-
ommended, so state and briefly describe the reasons therefor.
Item 15. Financial statements and supplementary data.
If action is to be taken with respect to any matter specified in [Item 14, Mergers, consolida-
tions, acquisitions and similar matters] furnish the [required] financial statement ....
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preting that phrase in Yamamoto v. Omiya,57 required a substantial con-
nection between the person's name and the solicitation effort. Thus, it can
be argued that this provision was not intended to apply to accountants
unless they were actively seeking the proxy solicitation or stood to gain
from its success. If an accounting firm's role does not fit within either
"soliciting" or "using its name to solicit," accountants should not be
held liable as primary violators of the proxy rules.
Arguments do exist, however, for holding accountants primarily liable.
Courts have imposed special responsibilities on accountants despite lan-
guage in security provisions that arguably excludes them. 58 For example,
in SEC v. Coffey, 59 the Sixth Circuit claimed: "An accountant. . . who
prepares a dishonest statement is a primary participant in a violation [of
section 10(b)] even though someone else may conduct the personal nego-
tiations with a securities purchaser."60 If an accountant can be held liable
in connection with a "purchase or sale of any security" 61 under rule
10b-5, 62 it seems possible, by analogy, to find an accountant liable as a
primary violator of section 14(a) for preparing a faulty proxy statement.
In addition, accountants play a special role in the securities field be-
cause of the public's dependence on their accuracy. 63 The importance of
this role could give the accountants' activities a "substantial connection
with the solicitation effort" that would justify primary liability for mis-
statements. Therefore, there is support for the court's assumption in
Adams that accountants can be held liable as primary violators of proxy
provisions. This author thinks that accountants should be held liable in
light of their special position in the securities field.64
57. 564 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that including the name of the proposed purchaser of
the corporation's building in the proxy statement did not render him liable for any deception in it).
58. See generally note 91 and accompanying text infra.
59. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
60. Id. at 1315 n.24.
61. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976) (reproduced in pertinent part
in note 25 supra).
62. 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1981) (reproduced in pertinent part in note 26 supra).
63. The district court in Adams held that Peat owed a duty to the shareholders stating:
Additionally, an accountant owes a duty to the public to be independent of his client and to
report fairly the facts before him.
"The policy underlying the securities laws of providing investors with all the facts needed to
make intelligent investment decisions can only be accomplished if financial statements fully and
fairly portray the actualfinancial condition of the company."
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,683, at 90,364-65 (quoting Herzfeld v.
Laventhol, Kreskstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)) (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
64. "A really successful fraud can scarcely be accomplished in our complex financial worlds
without the help of accountants and lawyers. This may be active and intentional connivance or it may
be more passive and subtle, but it is frequently essential." Speech of former SEC Chairman Ray
Garret, Jr. before ABA National Institute of Professional Liability, in Montreal (May 30-31, 1974),
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B. What is the Appropriate Standard of Culpability for Primary
Violators?
1. Is the Court Proposing a Uniform Standard of Scienter for All
Primary Violators?
The court of appeals in Adams, in requiring scienter, did not rely on the
language of section 14(a). Instead, it focused on the failure of rule 14a-9
to require privity or reliance, two procedural safeguards present in other
security provisions where Congress imposes liability for negligence. 65
The court apparently concluded that the "less exacting standard of mate-
riality, "66 used as a surrogate for those safeguards in private rights of
quoted in Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L.
REv. 31,96 n.234 (1975).
65. 623 F.2d at 428-29. See note 39 supra. The Third Circuit in Gould focused on the similari-
ties between § II of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976), and § 14(a) of the 1934 Act and not on
the differences between reliance and materiality. The court said that both provisions enumerate "spe-
cific classes of individuals who bear liability for failure to meet the required standard of disclosure.
Moreover, each involves single specific documents which are of primary importance in ... funda-
mental areas of securities regulation .... Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d at 777.
Because of these similarities the court claimed both should have a negligence standard.
66. 623 F.2d at 429. The Sixth Circuit's attitude toward the materiality standard apparently fol-
lows from Supreme Court comments in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. The Court compared § 10(b)
with provisions of the 1933 Act which specifically allowed recovery for negligent conduct stating:
We think these procedural limitations indicate that the judicially created private damages rem-
edy under § 10(b)-which has no comparable restrictions-cannot be extended, consistently
with the intent of Congress, to actions premised on negligent wrong-doing. Such extension
would allow causes of action covered by §§ 11 [and] 12(2) .. .to be brought instead under §
10(b) and thereby nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on these
express actions.
425 U.S. at 210 (footnotes omitted). The Court later claimed that the comparison with other security
provisions was not the determinative factor in deciding on a scienter standard for § 10(b). Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 n.9 (1980).
There is no suggestion by the Sixth Circuit that a negligence standard under § 14(a) would intrude
on the subject matter of § 11 or § 12 of the 1933 Act. In addition, the procedural restrictions the
Supreme Court referred to in Hochfelder were the posting of bond for costs (including attorney fees)
and the length of the statute of limitations. The Court said nothing about materiality being a "less
exacting standard" than reliance.
The Court rejected the use of reliance under the proxy provisions in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1975), because it was impractical to apply a reliance test to thousands of share-
holders. See notes 9-I1 and accompanying text supra. In TSC Indus.. Inc., v. Northway. Inc.,
426 U.S. 438 (1976), the Court explicitly recognized the potentially great liability for a rule 14a-9
violation if the standard of materiality was unnecessarily low. It was for this reason the Court rejected
a standard holding a fact material if it might affect the voting process in favor of a standard requiring a
substantial likelihood the omitted fact would have significance to a reasonable shareholder. Id. at
448-49. See notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text supra.
The Sixth Circuit unnecessarily denigrates the materiality standard which is the cornerstone of the
disclosure policy of the federal securities laws. The Supreme Court claimed that the materiality stan-
dard was the best balance between protecting the investor and subjecting the potential violator to
unreasonable liability. The Sixth Circuit should have deferred to the Supreme Court's opinion on this
subject and used other means to justify its finding. For a discussion of materiality, see Hewitt, Devel-
oping Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAW. 887 (1977).
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action under section 14(a), was insufficient protection against liability if
coupled with a negligence standard. Thus, the court required scienter.
The court also relied on legislative history because neither the statute
nor the rule designate a standard of culpability. 67 The court cited a Senate
report to the 1934 Act which stated that SEC rules and regulations would
"protect investors from promiscuous solicitation of their proxies ... by
irresponsible outsiders seeking to wrest control.., and.., by unscrupu-
lous corporate officials seeking to retain control . . . by concealing and
distorting facts. "68 The court used this broad statement to support its po-
sition that Congress intended to require intentional conduct for accountant
liability. 69
These reasons for requiring scienter have broad implications. The ra-
tionale is equally applicable to all primary violators. If the court intended
scienter as a uniform standard, its decision is contrary to the conclusions
of courts in two other circuits which have considered the issue of the ap-
propriate standard of culpability. The Second Circuit in Gerstle v. Gam-
ble-Skogmo, Inc.,70 held that when the soliciting corporation was the de-
fendant in a suit for damages under rule 14a-9, negligence was the
proper standard; it reserved the right to require a higher standard of culp-
ability if circumstances, such as the absence of privity, called for it.7 1
Negligence was also held to be the standard by the Third Circuit in Gould
v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 72 in which the defendant was an
outside, non-management director of the soliciting corporation. Both
courts emphasized that neither section 14(a) nor rule 14a-9 contained
words such as "manipulative," "deceptive," or "contrivance," which
were used by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder73 as a
basis for requiring scienter under section 10(b). 74
In addition, the language of rule 14a-9 is virtually identical to that of
67. 623 F.2d at 429.
68. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1934), quoted in Adams, 623 F.2d at 429 (em-
phasis provided by court). The court found significant the report's use of the words "unscrupulous,"
"concealing," and "distorting," which the court claimed implied knowledge or scienter. The court
interpreted "promiscuous" as meaning reckless. 623 F.2d at 430.
69. Id.
70. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
71. Id. at 1300-01. The court identified privity, although not required under the security provi-
sion, as bearing heavily on the appropriate standard of culpability. The court also said that whether or
not the transaction benefited the defendant was important. Id. at 1300. Gerstle is not necessarily
contrary to Adams because of the lack of privity in the latter. The Adams court, however, did not
apply the same rationale as the Gerstle court but instead drew opposite conclusions from the legisla-
tive history.
72. 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
73. 425 U.S. 185, 199(1976).
74. Gould, 535 F.2d at 777; Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1281.
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section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 193375 which was interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Aaron v. SEC 76 not to require scienter. 77 This is
further evidence that the language of section 14(a) does not require scien-
ter.
The congressional statements the court of appeals cites in Adams are
not as persuasive as the court suggests. There is no doubt that Congress
enacted section 14(a) to stop severe abuses such as those listed in the
Senate report. On the other hand, there is no evidence that Congress in-
tended to limit the SEC's regulatory authority to "manipulative or decep-
tive" acts. If Congress intended to limit the SEC's authority, it could
have included in section 14(a) the restrictions found in section 10(b). A
House report suggests that Congress intended the SEC's regulatory au-
thority under the 1934 Act to include situations unknown to and unde-
scribed by Congress. 78 Thus, the SEC was given broad grants of power to
define violations of the proxy statute. The absence of language in the stat-
ute setting forth the appropriate standard of culpability also implies that
this definition was to be left to the SEC's discretion. The congressional
statements relied upon by the Adams court describe the extremes to which
the statute was to apply, and were made to aid its passage. It is question-
able whether these statements should be conclusive as to the statute's
scope.
The Second and Third Circuits agree that if the defendant is the solicit-
ing corporation, negligence is the appropriate standard. 79 To the extent
75. The Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976), provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the
mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . ...
(emphasis added).
76. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
77. The Court stated that "[iln the absence of a conflict between reasonably plain meaning and
legislative history, the words of the statute must prevail." Id. at 700 (footnotes omitted). Scienter
was required under § 17(a)(1) because it contains language similar to that found in § 10(b).
78. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934) states:
[T]he complicated nature of the problems justif[y] leaving much greater latitude of discretion
with the administrative agencies than would otherwise be the case. It is for that reason that the
bill in dealing with a number of difficult problems singles out these problems as matters appro-
priate to be subject to restrictive rules and regulations, but leaves to the administrative agencies
the determination of the most appropriate form of rule or regulation to be enforced.
79. See notes 70-72 and accompanying text supra.
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the Sixth Circuit suggests scienter as a uniform standard for all defen-
dants, it adopts a minority position.80
2. Is the Same Standard of Culpability Appropriate for All Primary
Violators?
Because of the many different potential defendants in a section 14(a)
action, application of a uniform standard of culpability is questionable.
The court in Adams itself suggested a need to consider the special circum-
stances of the parties. 81 If, for example, negligence were chosen as the
appropriate standard, in harmony with Gerstle and Gould, it would have
to be applied to accountants held to be primary participants. Many courts
have been reluctant to impose liability on accountants for mere negli-
gence because of their unique position, focusing especially on their lim-
ited contact with the public. For example, in Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche,82 Justice Cardozo said that in the absence of any privity require-
ment, "[i]f liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder
... may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."
This same concern was voiced by the court of appeals in Adams: "Un-
like the corporate issuer, the preparation of financial statements to be ap-
pended to proxies and other reports is the daily fare of accountants, and
the accountant's potential liability for relatively minor mistakes would be
enormous under a negligence standard.' 83 The court found the potential
for liability especially high because rule 14a-9 does not require privity or
reliance but only a showing of materiality. 84
Courts have also hesitated to apply the same culpability standard to
lawyers and other experts giving advice to corporations as they apply to
the corporation itself.8 5 Some commentators on rule lOb-5 litigation
claim that one standard of culpability is not feasible considering all the
80. See note 17 supra. But see Note, The Proper Standard of Fault for Imposing Personal Liabil-
ity on Corporate Directors for False or Misleading Statements in Proxy Solicitations under Section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 14a-9, 34 OHio STATE L.J. 670 (1973),
where the author claims that a modified scienter standard is the proper standard of fault for corporate
directors under the proxy provisions.
81. See text accompanying notes 37 & 38 supra.
82. 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441,444(1931).
83. 623 F.2d at 428.
84. Id. at 428-29. See notes 39 & 66 supra.
85. See Mann, Rule 1Ob-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases
of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1206 (1970).
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possible relationships between plaintiffs and defendants. 86 The Ninth Cir-
cuit's solution was to focus on the duty the particular defendant owed to
the plaintiff and vary the culpability required according to the strength of
that duty. 87 The Ninth Circuit's flexible-duty standard answers the critics'
complaints about the uniform standard of culpability and allows courts to
require a greater showing of culpability for more remote defendants with-
out lessening the protection of investors against more central violators.
3. Did the Court in Adams Implicitly Apply a Flexible-Duty Standard?
The flexible-duty approach varies the standard of culpability according
to the nature of the interaction between the various plaintiffs and defen-
dants. This approach allows courts to consider all factors they deem im-
portant in assessing liability, but frees them from the need to fit a particu-
lar defendant into a previously defined class with a set standard of
culpability. 88
The Ninth Circuit suggested, that when assessing liability, courts
should consider the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, the rela-
tive access each has to the information, the benefit the defendant derives
from the relationship, the degree to which the defendant was aware of the
plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's activity, and the defendant's role in
initiating the security transaction. 89 Courts may add to this list as the par-
ticular case demands. A standard of culpability is applied according to the
particular facts of the case. 90 Negligence would be the minimum standard
86. See, e.g., 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COsINODITIEs FRAUD §
8.4 (513), at 204.115 (1981), where the author states:
A comprehensive scienter standard would have to fit the enormous variability of lOb-5 private
suits, including
(1) Whether the violation is misrepresentation, nondisclosure or some more complex scheme
or manipulation;
(2) Whether there is privity, a lesser relationship (such as aiding-abetting or conspiracy) or no
privity at all (as in insider trading cases); in the parlance of this text, whether the transactions are
direct or indirect, personal or impersonal;
(3) Whether there is one plaintiff or thousands;
(4) Whether there is some special relationship between the parties, such as fiduciary-benefici-
ary or broker-customer;
(5) Whether the relief sought is damages, recission, injunction or something else.
There is a real question whether a single standard can do the job adequately.
See also Mann, note 85 supra.
87. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
88. Id. at 734. The Ninth Circuit stated: "By adopting such a duty analysis, we avoid the confu-
sion that arises from classifying the defendants as primary and secondary. or from classifying the
transactions as direct and indirect."
89. Id. at 735-36.
90. There was some question as to whether the flexible-duty standard survived Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder because the standard allowed liability for negligence under rule lb-5, whereas Hoch-
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under section 14(a) applied to central actors. Courts may apply a reckless-
ness standard or higher for persons with less contact.
The court of appeals' opinion in Adams should be viewed as implicitly
applying a flexible-duty standard. This makes its requirement of scienter
for the accounting firm more justifiable, given the facts of this case. The
facts, however, do not lead to a clear result on the appropriate standard of
culpability.
Facts that could have influenced the court to use a lower standard of
culpability are as follows. First, as an accountant, Peat had a special rela-
tionship with the public under federal securities law and owed a duty of
care to the shareholders from whom the proxies were solicited. 91 Peat
also had greater access to the information than the shareholders. In addi-
tion, it could protect itself from loss caused by liability, either through
insurance or by the exercise of greater care. The shareholders had no rea-
son to suspect the footnote was erroneous, and thus were unable to protect
themselves. Furthermore, since the financial statements were material,
Peat was aware that the shareholders would consider them in making their
decision. 92 Peat's duty to give accurate information to the shareholders
under these factors points toward a lower standard of culpability.
Balanced against these factors, however, are others that indicate a
higher standard of culpability is appropriate. Peat did not initiate the se-
curity transaction and did not benefit from the approval of the merger.
Peat also was not in privity with the shareholders; the court in Gerstle
claimed that privity was an important factor in determining the degree of
culpability required. 93 By balancing these circumstances in favor of a
higher standard of culpability with the above factors, the Adams court
could conclude that a scienter standard was appropriate on these facts. 94
felder required recklessness. Since Hochfelder, however, the standard has been applied with a reck-
lessness minimum in both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. See Steinberg & Gruenbaum, Variations of
"Recklessness" After Hochfelder and Aaron, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 179,203-08 (1980). There should be
no problem in using the flexible-duty standard under rule 14a-9 since it does not require a scienter
minimum.
91. See, e.g., Isbell, An Overview of Accountants' Duties and Liabilities under the Federal Se-
curities Laws and a Closer Look at Whistle-Blowing, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 261 (1974); Kosek, Profes-
sional Responsibility of Accountants and Lawyers before the Securities and Exchange Commission,
72 LAw LIB. J. 453 (1979), reprinted in SECuRmEs LAw REviEw-1980, at 523 (H. Blumenthal ed.
1980). Peat recognized the need for greater care when it charged 125% of its normal fee because of
the securities nature of the job. Adams, 623 F.2d at 439 (Weick, J., dissenting).
92. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
93. 478 F.2d at 1300.
94. But see Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where the court held a showing
of negligence was sufficient to impose liability on an accountant for not correcting prior audited
statements when the accountant later discovered the statements were materially misleading when
made. The decision was based on both the common law and § 10(b). A different result would be
reached under the § 10(b) claim after Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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C. IfAccountants Are Not Primary Violators, Are They Liable for
Aiding and Abetting?
The scienter requirement could also be justified by applying an aiding
and abetting theory. 95 Statutory language does not preclude accountant
liability for aiding and abetting a primary participant's violation of sec-
tion 14(a). 96 Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed this
issue, 97 most of the circuits that have considered the question with respect
to other security provisions have found such secondary liability possi-
ble. 98 The Sixth Circuit, in SEC v. Coffey, 99 also held that aiding and
95. The district court in Adams used an aiding and abetting theory to hold Peat liable under §
14(a), saying: "In short, defendant's financial statements were not neutral but were knowingly and
deliberately biased. This constituted advocacy and in practical effect a solicitation of approval for the
Chadboum merger; and therefore aiding and abetting a proxy solicitation by Peat." [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,683, at 90,370.
96. A commentator defined secondary liability saying "persons owing direct duties to the public
will be classified as primary wrong-doers. Those whose liabilities arise only because another has
violated the law will be called secondary wrongdoers." Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities
Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, in Pari Delicto, Indemnification. and Contribu-
tion, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 600 (1972). Therefore the statutory language would need to cover only
the primary violator.
But see Fischel, Secondary Liability under Section 10(b) ofthe Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L.
REV. 80 (1981), in which the author claims that in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, aiding
and abetting liability applies only to those security provisions that explicitly provide for it. Under this
proposal, if the accused violator does not qualify as a primary violator under the provision in ques-
tion, the only recourse open to a plaintiff would be to find liability against the alleged violator under §
10(b) for a "manipulative or deceptive act." This, the author claims, often includes accountants who
knowingly prepare and certify false and misleading financial statements in connection with a sale or
purchase of a security. Id. at 107-08.
97. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), came to the Supreme Court after the
Seventh Circuit held the defendant accounting firm liable as an aider and abettor for failing to dis-
cover the fraud of the primary wrongdoer. 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 185
(1976). In a footnote the Supreme Court stated: "In view of our holding that an intent to deceive.
manipulate, or defraud is required for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. we need not
consider whether civil liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and the Rule
- 425 U.S. at 191 n.7.
98. See Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1979); Monsen v. Consoli-
dated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth.
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978): SEC v. Coffey.
493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
These courts based their finding of aiding and abetting liability on tort principles. Section 876 of
the Restatement of Torts provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a person is liable if
he
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance
or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own
conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939).
99. 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
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abetting a rule lOb-5 violation gave rise to an actionable claim. In
Gould, the Third Circuit discussed approvingly the possible application
of aiding and abetting principles to the accused proxy violators. 100
The standards for imposing liability on one who aids and abets another
in committing a securities violation are stricter than those necessary to
hold a primary violator liable. The court in Coffey set forth three elements
that must be met to hold a person liable as an aider-abettor. 101 First, there
must be a securities law violation by some other party. Second, it must be
shown that there was general awareness or knowledge by the aider-abet-
tor that his or her role was part of the improper activity. Some courts have
viewed this general awareness requirement as insufficient and substituted
as a requirement actual or constructive notice102 of the intended impropri-
ety. The higher standardavoids unreasonable imposition of liability on
defendants who may have been unaware of the results of their actions.
Finally, the potential aider and abettor must have knowingly and sub-
stantially assisted the violation. This requirement is generally met if the
court finds that the aider-abettor recklessly assisted a wrongful act. In
addition, when money damages are sought, at least one circuit requires a
breach of fiduciary duty. 103 Usually more than mere inaction is required
because of courts' reluctance to impose a duty to investigate.10 4 Failure to
state facts necessary to make statements not false or misleading, though,
is not viewed as mere inaction, particularly when the omission is
known. 105
It is highly probable that both Chadbourn, Inc. and Standard Knitting
Mills were primary violators of rule 14a-9 when they failed to correct the
100. 535 F.2d761,778-81 (3d Cir. 1976).
101. 4931F.2dat 1304.
102. The Third Circuit stated in Gould that the knowledge requirement "may be less strict where
the alleged aider and abettor derives benefits from the wrongdoing but even in this situation the proof
offered must establish conscious involvement in impropriety or constructive notice of intended im-
propriety." 535 F.2d at 780. See Ruder, supra note 96, at 638 ("[a]dherence to the knowledge
requirement still allows imposition of liability in appropriate cases, since knowledge can be shown by
reckless conduct or through inference").
103. Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478,484 (2d Cir. 1979).
In this rule lOb-5 case, the court stated: "We have not used the 'recklessness' standard when money
damages are claimed in an aiding and abetting context, except on the basis of a breach of fiduciary
duty."
104. See Ruder, supra note 96, at 641-44.
105. The Second Circuit in United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 934 (1976), held that an accountant has a duty to correct earlier audited financial statements
if it becomes known that figures in the report in question are materially false and misleading and there
is a chance to correct them. This was a criminal prosecution under §§ 14 & 32 of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78ff& 78n.
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erroneous footnote in the financial statements. 106 Furthermore, Peat had
both a general awareness and actual knowledge of its role in the viola-
tion. 107 Most courts, however, require at least reckless assistance of the
violation for aiding and abetting liability because of the more remote po-
sition of the defendant. 108 If the Adams court was correct in finding Peat's
conduct negligent, but not reckless,109 then its decision is supportable
under an aiding and abetting theory.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit should be commended for
finding that accountants can be liable for proxy violations under section
14(a). Unfortunately, the court failed to explain how it reached that re-
sult. The court should have also been more explicit as to whether it in-
tended scienter to be the standard of culpability for all primary proxy vio-
lators or just accountants. The court's reasoning is sufficiently broad to
infer an intention to require scienter as the appropriate standard of culpa-
bility for all defendants. This endangers future investors' attempts to pro-
tect their interests against proxy violators who are not accountants. Ex-
plicit use of a flexible-duty standard or an aiding and abetting theory
would have given the court's decision more support without eliminating
the proper use of a negligence standard against more central actors, such
as a soliciting corporation. Although the court made a positive contribu-
tion in holding accountants potentially liable under section 14(a), its con-
tribution would have been more positive if it had used a rationale that
made clear the standard of culpability to be used in various private rights
of action for proxy violations.
Bruce E. Dick
106. It is questionable whether the corporations needed to be informed of the error to be found
negligent.
107. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
108. See Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp.. 602 F.2d 478. 484 (2d Cir.
1979), quoted in note 103 supra (recklessness not sufficient).
109. The court could have avoided the entire issue of the appropriate standard of culpability by
applying the clearly erroneous standard to the district court's finding that Peat acted with scienter and
upholding that finding. Peat's conduct was close enough to constituting recklessness to at least war-
rant discussion of it.
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